

Assessing Nigeria's Peacekeeping Operations around the Globe: Experience from Prime Minister Balewa to President Jonathan Regime.

Mohammad Zaki Ahmad (PhD)
School of International Studies,
Universiti Utara Malaysia
Email: mohdzaki@uum.edu.my

Oladimeji Talibu (PhD)
Department of History and International Studies,
Al-Hikmah University, Ilorin, Nigeria
E-mail: talibuoladimeji@alhikmah.edu.ng

Abstract

A peacekeeping operation is an essential part of humanitarian intervention in conflict zones around the globe. It is part of the UN resolution to launch peacekeeping operations where it is necessary. Nigeria, as an integral member of the UN and other international organisations, is a key player in peacekeeping missions around the world, most importantly in Africa. Scholars have discussed extensively, under various administrations, the role of Nigeria in peacekeeping missions abroad without appraising the benefits of such missions to Nigeria. The current research thus queries the benefits and losses gained in the peacekeeping operations between 1960 and 2015. In this way, the research examines the role of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations from Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa's government to President Goodluck Jonathan's. Such a timeline gives enough space to assess the strains and stresses on Nigeria's peacekeeping operations. The Meta-Analysis technique was employed as a secondary source of Textbooks, articles, journals, documents, speeches, and newspaper articles relevant to the field of study were used to collect data. The overall assessment reveals that Nigeria's government has been consistent in its peacekeeping operations around the globe since independence, which rests on one of the cardinal principles of Nigeria's foreign policy-maintenance of a peaceful and just world. The research also underlines the training and financial opportunities Nigerian soldiers are accessible to in engaging in peacekeeping operations.

Keywords: Nigeria, Peacekeeping, Foreign Policy, Resolution, Africa

Introduction

The concept of peacekeeping and peacemaking are normally used interchangeably in the political parlance, which seems to suggest that they represent the same meaning. Notwithstanding, both concepts are applied to denote different strategies adopted in the conflict areas of the world and the employment of each depends on the situation at hand. In terms of definition, therefore, peacekeeping is a third party mechanism by which the peace process is attained in a certain area of the globe (Eugene, 2014). Peacekeeping mission does not allow for military intervention and it requires the invitation and acceptance of the warring factions (Ojekwe, 2010).

The main philosophy behind the concept is the need to supervise peace so that the fragile political atmosphere does not escalate into open conflict (Abdulwaheed, 2012). In this case the

peacekeeping mission stay aloof and watch the situation with keen interest in which case the limited military combat would only be considered for self-defence (Stahn, 2003). It needs to be noted that the contemporary peacekeeping operations under multilateral organisations is not limited only to combatants but also includes personnel from all walks of life like diplomats, lawyers, civil society, police, doctors etc. (Stahn, 2003). While it may be possible to assert that there is a difference between peacekeeping and peacemaking, both are inextricably interwoven in all practicality. For purpose of differentiation, peacemaking is a process by which the third party is forced into action in the face of total breakdown of law and order in a certain state (Kratochwil, 1994). This type of mechanism is employed in a situation where there is a full escalation of war. In such situation, it is the responsibility of the peacemaking mission to quell the tides of war and to ensure that the appropriate mechanism is employed to broker the ceasefire. It is after this partial peacemaking effort that the peacekeeping mission would take over. Peacekeeping mission can come in either before the escalation of the conflict or after the ceasefire agreement between the warring factions in order to avert another looming danger of conflict escalation (Sule, 201).

Thus, the concept of peacekeeping and peacemaking have been important mechanisms, employed by the UN, ECOWAS and the OAU/AU, to settle inter and intra-state conflicts in the global political stage. It needs to be stated here that the multilateral peacekeeping operation by Nigeria is a way of displaying its hegemonic presence in the African regional affairs and in this circumstance; it may not be possible to delve into all regions of the world where Nigeria engaged in such act. Nevertheless, a table is provided which summarily explains all Nigeria's multilateral undertakings. The history of multilateral peacekeeping in Nigeria's foreign policy started all away from the time of independence in Congo (Akinterinwa, 2015). The need to ensure that peace and stability reigned in the continent of Africa and the entire globe has been an important propeller for Nigeria's engagement in the multilateral peace operations. According to Stahn (2003), with the exception of India, no other country in Africa or in the global south surpassed the records of Nigeria in the area of global peace operations (Sewall, 2002). This point can be buttress based on analysis presented in table 1 and 2.

Table 1: Top Ten UN Troop Contributors, 2000

Country	Troops Provided for UN-led Operations	Percentage of UN Troops Deployed
India	3, 957	14%
Nigeria	3, 231	12%
Jordan	2, 217	8%
Australia	1, 842	7%
Bangladesh	1, 509	6%
Ghana	1, 438	5%
Kenya	1, 124	4%
Poland	992	4%
Thailand	908	3%
Philippines	825	3%

Table 2: Top Ten UN Troop Contributors, 2014

Country	Troops Provided for UN-led Operations	Percentage of UN Troops Deployed
Bangladesh	9,400	9%
India	8,139	7.8%
Pakistan	7,936	7.6%
Ethiopia	7,807	7.5%
Rwanda	5,698	5.4%
Nepal	5,089	4.9%
Ghana	2,987	2.8%
Nigeria	2,930	2.8%
Senegal	2,835	2.7%
Egypt	2,613	2.5%

(Source:http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtm)

The two tables above narrates different story about Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. The loss of Nigeria's top position to some African and Asian countries can be attributed to the growing domestic and regional demands for Nigerian troops. In addition, the rise of other states like Rwanda, Nepal, and Senegal in troop's contribution may explain the loss of high percentage attained in 2000 as compared to 2014. This applies to all major troops contributing nations.

Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping are roughly grouped into three categories i.e. global operations, continental operations and sub-regional operations. At all levels of peacekeeping operations, Nigeria performs creditably and its consistency and commitments have been globally recognized. In order to simplify the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping, each mission will be discussed under different section.

Nigeria in the Congo (1960)

The first attempt to engage in multilateral peacekeeping operation was in Congo in 1960 when General Aguiry Ironsi of Nigeria commandeered the UN peacekeeping forces in Congo (Fafowora, 1997:52). The Nigerian Prime Minister, Balewa, in order to make sure the conflict eased, was elected by the UN as the Chairman of the Congo Advisory Committee. This was the first time an African would be selected for an exalted position in the UN reconciliation committee. The defence of black-African interests in the global political space gained attention of Nigerian leaders at independence in 1960. Nigeria did not hesitate at the point of independence to realise that African destiny was in its hand. In realisation of this golden fact, all issues related to Africa have been occupying Nigeria's attention in the global politics. It was observed by Nigeria government at the point of independence that if Nigeria did not rise to the occasion of defending Africans anywhere in the globe, no other country would be capable of doing so (*Bolarinwa, 2015*).

It is thus in realization of the above that Nigeria responded to the Congo political debacle. Many high-rank officers like Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, who later became Nigerian Head of state, Lt. Colonel S.A Ademulegun, Major F.A Fajuyi, Brigadier Ogundipe and Major Hilary Njoku from Nigerian army were sent to the Congo to perform administrative role under the auspices of the UN (Chibundi, 2003). This was the first time Nigerian forces experience the international peacekeeping operation, and it also marked the first ever African involvement in peacekeeping (Agbakwuru, 2013). Nigeria performed creditably under the UN but because of the influence of external forces, the war raged on intractably for decades. In fact, the UN Secretary-General at the time, Mr. U Than, was highly disappointed to assert that: "Efforts to prevent the civil war and achieve reconciliation in the Congo were persistently obstructed and thwarted by professional adventurers who fought and killed for money" Quoted in (Chibundi, 2003). Such was the revelation of the high-level officer in the UN who was convinced that there were invisible hands in the Congo political situation which made it difficult for Nigeria and other states to achieve the intended aims of the UN in the intervention. This is because the colonial powers were not neutral in the crisis, most especially the British and the Belgian. Their roles were partial and it made it difficult for country like Nigeria to perform its mandate comfortably as assigned by the UN.

Chadian Crisis (1979)

Chadian political problems represented an important watershed in the history of peacekeeping in Africa. It is the first peacekeeping experience by the OAU since its inception in 1963 (Sesay, 1991:6). The peacekeeping in Chad was instigated by Nigerian government in 1979 in accordance to Kano Accord (Mays, 2002: 48). Under the commandship of Colonel Magoro, a Nigerian, Nigeria dispatched 800 men to the disputed Chad region in 1979 (Mays, 2002:40). Under the aegis of transformed OAU, Nigerian participated well in the peacekeeping operation in Chad and contributed greatly to the cessation of hostilities in Chad in 1982. The problem in Chad erupted as a result of the political rivalry between the two main factions. In 1979 a National

Reconciliation Committee on Chad was hosted in Lagos and Nigeria had to find a lasting solution to the complicated political situation (Akinterinwa, 2015).

In addition to Nigerian peacekeeping force, some African countries such as Senegal, Ghana and Mali also contributed large force for Chad crisis (Delancey, 1983). It was a Nigerian, Peter Onu, the Deputy OAU Secretary-General that suggested the conversion of the formed OAU Defence Force to peacekeeping in 1979 (Mays, 2002: 41). According to Sam Amoo, a former Ghanaian army and diplomat, Nigeria's leadership role continued (in Chad) with the convening of a conference on national reconciliation in Kano, Nigeria, on March 11, 1979. The conference was attended by representatives of four Chadian factions: President Malloum; Hissene Habre, leader of the Forces Armees du Nord (FAN); Goukouni Weddeye representing the FROLINAT; and Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman, leader of the Mouvement Populaire pour la Liberation de Tchad (MPLT, supported by Nigeria). Delegates from Nigeria, the Sudan, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, and a representative of the OAU participated in the conference. This conference (Kano I) was the first attempt to bring together all important factions and interested parties, within and without Chad, for the purpose of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The above testimony further confirmed the leadership role of Nigeria in the Chadian conflict. However, Muamar Gadaffi, the Libyan President at the time, acted in violation of Lagos Accord and decided to interrupt the fragile situation in Chad (Akinterinwa, Pers. Comm., January 28, 2015). The National Front for the Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) received the backing of Nigeria and eventually appointed Muhammed Shawa as the President (Delancey, 1983:173). The Libyan presence in the conflict compounded the already-tense political climate and made it difficult for Nigeria under the OAU to control the situation. The ceasefire thus broke down in 1982 under the umbrella of OAU Nigeria sent another set of soldiers to the conflict zone in Chad. Some African countries like Ghana, Mali and Niger also followed to send troops to Chad. Under the OAU agreement, each of the force-contributing states would be responsible for the financial responsibility of their forces (Sesay, 1991). Because some of the countries could not provide enough facilities to their troops and in this case, Nigeria assumed the responsibility (Sesay, 1991). Nigeria provided much of the finance and agreement was also reached among contributing countries which included the need for the external parties to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of Chad (Abas, 2004).

Thus, it was the financial arrangement that first challenged the ability of the OAU most as the organisation suffered from financial woe. Nigeria in this case sponsored the OAU intervention to the tune of \$80 million (Adebajo, 2002). In a personal discussion with Professor Kunle Lawal, a former Commissioner for Education in Lagos state, Nigeria and a Professor of Diplomatic History at University of Ibadan, he opined that “at the height of the Chadian crisis OAU could not maintain the upkeep and supervision of the troops and most troops-contributing nations were forced to withdraw from Chad” (Lawal, 2012). Those countries that maintained their stance suffered the worst of their lives as most could not meet the requirement of intervention (Shaw,

1983). Nigeria insisted to stay longer and was in charge of maintaining those forces from Ghana and Senegal because their countries could not provide for them (Richard, 2013:14). Nigeria provided this assistance under the OAU agreement that it would repay Nigeria back. However, Nigeria did not receive any financial reimbursement from OAU (Shaw, 1983). The amount of the debt owed by the OAU to Nigeria was \$80 million and was finally written off in 1989 under President Ibrahim Banangida (Adebajo, 2002:53). Despite growing domestic criticism on the debt forgiveness, the president did not yield and this scenario explains the burden a hegemon has to bear in its external relations.

Nigeria in the East Africa and Western Sahara

The Nigerian peacekeeping efforts also extended to the East African countries. Immediately after Somalia got its independence, there emerged border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia as it virtually occurred in most parts of the continent. The US agreed with the Nigerian-backed OAU resolution between Ethiopia and Somalia which stipulated that both countries should abide by the existing colonial boundary (Bolarinwa, 2015). In this case, Nigeria under OAU agreed that Somalia should rescind its irredentist ambition to occupy Ogaden and some parts of Ethiopia because of the presence of Somali ethnic minority (Bach, 1983:42). The resolution received a boost from the US and other partners to the conflict. Akinterinwa,(2015) opined that the leadership of Nigeria in Africa may be regarded as self-imposed in nature as no higher authority has ever made us to do so. This self-imposed leadership was showcased in the Horn of Africa when Nigeria quelled the border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia. Thus, the acceptance of the US and the warring factions of the solution provided by Nigeria through OAU could be regarded as the sign of recognising Nigeria's regional hegemonic posture in Africa. Thus, the agreement by the US with the OAU Ad-hoc Commission, chaired by Nigeria, could be regarded as the singular motivation for the success which Nigeria achieved in the area of peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa.

After the settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute, Nigeria under President Sheu Shagari settled the seeming division among the OAU members in 1980. In July, 1980 a meeting was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, which was scheduled to settle some African teething problems (Adetula, 2005:167). The mere mentioning of Sharawai Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara) issue resulted in an intense animosity among African countries because they could not agree on the resolution to be adopted (Bach, 1983). The Moroccan government regarded that part of Africa as its own while some African countries refused to abide by it. Consequently, Senegal and Morocco were threatening to leave the meeting. However, Nigerian president came on board to settle the matter among the OAU members amicably (Bach, 1983). This case has also been regarded as the diplomatic success of Nigeria in keeping Africa's unity. Thus, from 1960 until the late 1980s Nigeria has been particularly showcasing its hegemonic ambition through OAU, UN and Commonwealth and it was the outbreak of conflicts in Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Mali that forced Nigeria to respond immediately to the crack in the wall in all the

neighbouring West African countries. Nigeria responded towards all West African problems through the sub-regional multilateral organization, ECOWAS (Oladimeji and Ahmad, 2015).

Peacekeeping in the Mano River Region

Mano River region comprises four countries namely Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, and Ivory Coast. Virtually all of them have suffered from political turmoil of which Nigeria has grossly involved in terms of peacekeeping operations. The first of this intervention occurred in Liberia in 1990. The civil war erupted in Liberia in December 1989 before the final fate of Cold War struggle. The Cold War might well explain the outbreak of the conflict in Liberia because of the assistance provided to Samuel Doe government by the US-backed military regime (Olonisakin, 1998:101). As the intensity of the Cold War eased, the National Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Liberia (NPFL) under the command and leadership of Charles Taylor overran the Samuel Doe government and the conflict erupted in a large scale not ever witnessed in African history. The lawlessness in the region thus made Nigeria intervention inevitable. Ogaba (2015) stresses that the problems in Mano River Basin countries have received attention of various Nigerian governments, the problems of which Nigeria did not know anything about. Most of us are convinced that the problems were partly emanated from Cold War rivalries between powers most especially that of Liberia. Nigeria responded quickly in order that the conflict is arrested before assuming regional dimension. The concern of Nigeria about human disaster this may produce, if left unattended to, forced Nigerian government to sponsor the Banjul Conference in the early 1990 to intervene in Liberia (Ero, 1995).

The problem lies in the fact that ECOWAS was not designed, from the incipient, to respond to such large-scale crisis. Although Mutual Assistance Defence (MAD) was signed among the ECOWAS members in 1981, it has never been put to use (ECOWAS, 1981). Because of its overwhelming power in West Africa, which gives rooms for mutual suspicion among the smaller countries in the region, Nigeria exercised restraint to sponsor any sub-regional military initiative that might reduce the incidence of conflict in West Africa. This was intentional in order to allay the fears of ECOWAS members about the hegemonic aspiration of Nigeria within the West African sub region (Osuntokun, 2010). Since MAD could not be invoked to respond to Liberian crisis, the Banjul Conference produced mechanisms under which the members had to respond to the crisis in Liberia (Salami, 2013:780). In this case, ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) was formed to respond to Liberian crisis and Article 52 of the UN Charter supported this stance. The article is a UN initiative, which stipulated that in the event of any outbreak of conflict, it might be beneficial for the regional initiatives or organisation to take over the responsibility of maintaining peace and order (Abas, 2004). And because of the familiar terrain of the regional organisation, it is assumed such may be in the best form to put the conflict to rest. It was under this liberty that ESMC was empowered to take over the responsibility of quelling the tide of conflict in Liberia (Daily Champion, 2010).

Thus, the ESMC provided such regional initiatives for the military intervention in Liberia and with the subsequent creation of ECOMOG as the military arms of ECOWAS. It was after the adoption of the resolution in 1990 that the ECOMOG force went to Liberia for peacekeeping purpose (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013). Between 1990 and 1997, about 16,000 troops were stationed in Liberia with attendant financial cost (Adigbuo, 2013). Out of the 16,000 troops produced by the ECOWAS members, Nigeria contributed 12,000 troops, which amounted to 80% of all troops contributed (Hamman & Omojuwa, 2013:31). The President of Nigeria at the time, Ibrahim Babangida, suggested that, Nigeria has no territorial ambition in Liberia or anywhere else. We are in Liberia because events in the country have led to the massive destruction of property, the massacre by all the warring parties of thousands of innocent civilians including those of foreign nations, women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection contrary to all recognized standard of civilized behaviour and international ethics and decorum. To those involved in false historical comparisons, intellectual intoxication and phantom analysis, I ask, should Nigeria and all responsible countries in the sub-region stand and watch the whole of Liberia turned into one mass grave yard? (Babangida, 1990).

Nigeria, therefore, could not wait for the lives of millions of Liberian people who were in danger while the international response seemed not forthcoming. In another speech delivered at Press briefing in Lagos on the Liberian crisis, the president reiterated, *many people still holds parochial view about our military intervention in Liberia. We are in Africa and we have the responsibility to act.....ECOMOG does not force its way into Liberia likewise Nigeria* (Babangida, 1990).

It was the Commission, the Responsibility to Protect, which signaled the potential of the conflict degenerating into massive humanitarian disaster in West Africa. Based on this report, Nigerian president shoulder most of the responsibility to establish political decorum in Liberia (Bolarinwa, 2015). Between January 1990 and 1996, UN adopted 15 Resolutions that commended the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. AUNSC report states “its appreciation to the Chairman of ECOWAS for his initiative in organizing a regional summit on Liberia and to the Government of Nigeria..., and urges all parties to participate in the operation” (UNSC Report, 1995). Thus, the Liberian crisis with attendant intervention of Nigeria represented an important watershed in the humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War global politics because of the huge financial and material loss suffered by Nigeria, the public tended to criticise the regime for such a flamboyant foreign military mission. In response, the Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, asserts, *Perhaps many do not yet know, nor appreciate either the danger of international embarrassment the Liberian crisis portends for all of us in this sub-region in particular, and to Africa and the black race in general ...Our critics tend to ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in this sub-region...for the avoidance of doubt, neither Nigeria nor the members of the ECOMOG forced their way into the*

Liberian conflict in a manner Resembling military adventurism. Nigeria is a member of the sub-regional group that took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring factions in Liberia, (Babangida, 1990).

The declaration quoted above was in response to the domestic and international fear that Nigeria was on a subterranean mission to occupy a neighbouring country. To allay such a fear, Nigeria intervened according to the UN and ECOWAS mandate and in a certain case Nigerian commander in the Liberia, Joshua Dogonnyaro, was replaced with Ghanaians just to make sure that its mission was not tarnished with propaganda from foes in the neighbouring countries (Adebajo, 2008:70). The replacement of Nigerian force commander with that of Ghanaian was also in response to the accusation of Nigeria's domination in the intervention. Overall, Nigeria made peace with the rebel leader, Charles Taylor and included him in the interim national government.

It is of interest to note that the pattern of governance in Africa remained the same all over. The Liberian political turmoil by 1997 replicated itself with the ousting of elected president from office by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone which was believed to have the backing from Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor (Fawole, 2004:298). The RUF had been receiving training under Taylors' leadership of NPFL in Liberia, and the crisis of 1990 provided incentive for the RUF to dethrone the duly-elected president, Tejan Kabah of Sierra Leone (Sesay, 1998:64). Since ECOWAS members had already agreed on a resolution for not recognizing undemocratic regimes in Africa, ECOWAS under Nigeria's leadership went ahead to reinstate President Tejah Kabah in 1998 (Osuntokun, 2010). The military junta promised it would return power to democratically elected president but refused to fulfill its promise, a step that forced the ECOMOG to forcefully launch an attack on the RUF (Osuntokun, 2010). The war in Sierra Leone continued unabated under the ECOWAS. The continuation of the conflict meant there was need for ECOWAS member, most especially Nigeria, to accommodate other multilateral organisation to stamp out the incessant war. It was based on this that OAU and the UN peacekeeping forces intervened. However, the killings and the kidnappings of the UN peacekeepers by the RUF rebels worsened the case. With the persistence of Nigeria-led ECOMOG who continuously sustained casualties without relenting effort, forced the rebel to surrender and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was able to capture the rebels and supervised election in Sierra Leone (Saliu, 2007:105). The president was finally reinstated in 1998 by Nigerian-led forces controlled the capital, Freetown, and also assisted in peace building and personnel training in the aftermath of the war.

Multilateral Peacekeeping in Mali

In 2012, the Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping efforts continued in Mali. The case of Mali is a complex one because it involved terrorist groups known as Al-Qaeda. The roles of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, Tuareg Rebels Force and Ansar al-Din cannot be underestimated in the Malian case. The Mali case became an issue in 2012 with the fall of Libya's leader, Colonel Gaddafi (Ireogbu, 2012). Most of Tuareg rebel groups were part of forces that fought under Gaddafi in Libya. They fought to rescue Gaddafi from the opposition groups emerged during Arab Spring that radiated nearly all the political landscape of the Arab World (Obayuwana, 2012). With the fall of Gaddafi, the weapons that were used in the revolution in Libya by the Tuareg were not surrendered. This gave them ample chance to use the weapons to launch attacks on Mali government. They declared separate region in the northern part of Mali, which was imminent for the entire region. Because of the reluctance of the UN to intervene, Nigeria led ECOWAS forces into Mali to nip the war in the bud before it went out of hand (Oshegale, 2013).

With the intensity of AQIM onslaught in the northern Mali in 2012, it became increasingly clear to the Mali government in Bamako that they needed foreign assistance (This Day, November 23, 2012). It was based on this realistic assessment that the Bamako government requested Nigeria to lead ECOWAS troop into Mali in November, 2012 (Oyedele, 2012). Nigeria needed to debate this in the National Assembly before any response was made. Senator David Mark, the Senate President, discussed the issue in the House of Senate, after which there was unanimous agreement that Nigeria should intervene in Mali (Senate Report, November, 2012). Thus, \$34 million was approved in January 2013 for such operation and Nigeria led ECOWAS into Mali. Apart from regional approval, the UNSC Resolution 2071 of 2012 also authorised Nigeria to lead ECOWAS intervention in Mali (Adigbuo, 2013:17-18). During the intervention, the Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, addressed the Donors' Conference organised at the end of the 20th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit in Ethiopia (Adigbuo, 2013:17)). The session identified raping, plundering, and assaults on the civilian as the most heinous crimes committed by AQIM all of which could not be controlled by Mali government. Thus, Nigeria led ECOWAS into Mali with the approval of the UNSC and the AU in 2012 and subsequently brought the conflict to condition of relative peace (UNSC, 2012).

Sudan Crisis and Nigeria's Intervention

The Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking mission do not limit its presence to Sub-Saharan African alone. The Sudan crisis, which dated back to 1930s, also received the attention of Nigerian government. According to International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the Sudanese government in Khartoum has been using various methods to suppress the rights of Darfurians in the south for decades (ICG, 2005). The peak of the tension resurfaced in 2003 when the National Islamic Front (NIF) under the auspices of Khartoum government allegedly used force and military means to suppress the people of Darfur. The Khartoum government under Omar al-Basher accused the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

as constituting a potent threat to the government of Sudan (Ngwube, 2013:85). In this way the two liberation organisations was labeled as terrorist groups by the Khartoum government and the government proceeded to use Janjweed to suppress them militarily (Ngwube, 2013:86). The Janjaweed under the Popular Defence Force (PDF) perpetrated all sorts of atrocities that the UN categorised as ethnic cleansing and genocide (UNSC Report, 2003).

Thus, Janjaweed carried sporadic attack on the civilians and the children without any concrete and substantial justification to do so. The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that many women were raped and men massacred unjustifiably while over 200,000 people were forced out of their location to seek refuge elsewhere (Ngwube, 2013:84). The atrocities being perpetrated by the Janjaweed, forces fully backed by the Khartoum government, led some people to believe that the Khartoum government intentionally engaged in a systematic way of exterminating the blacks and non-Muslims from Darfur region (Saka, 2008). According to Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Nigeria was initially astonished and could not really understand the plight of Khartoum government (IRIN, 2004). But because of the effect of the refugees being produced by the military onslaught on the neighbouring countries, most especially the Chad, the government of Chad was forced to intervene. The Chadian President, Derby, presented the case to the OAU because its initial intervention did not achieve anything (Ngwube, 2013: 85).

With the agreement in May 2004 among the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments of the AU, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed to quell the seemingly degenerating situation in Darfur, most especially the humanitarian crisis (Ogaba,2015). The result of the agreement led to the deployment of 300 forces from Nigeria and Rwanda to the Darfur region and the peace talks continued in Abuja, Nigeria (IRIN, 2004). The presence of Nigeria in Darfur was immense in 2004. The Chairperson of the AU at the time President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in agreement with the AU members suggested that there was a need to neutralise Janjaweed force in Darfur and to intensify effort at arresting the influx of refugees to the neighbouring countries most especially in the Chad (Ngwube, 2013:87). It was based on this situation appraisal that the AU Chairperson appointed another Nigerian, a former military president, Abdusalam Abubakar, as the special envoy to Chad and Sudan to mediate in the conflict in Darfur. The special envoy report on the situation in Darfur was not satisfactory to the AU members. This also led the organisation to intensify efforts at bringing the rebels and the central government together in Abuja, Nigeria in August, 2004 for the purpose of settling the conflict situation (Ebegbulem, 2012:5). In this case, Abuja Peace Agreement was signed and it led to Darfur Peace Accord.

Therefore, the failure of the Chadian President to intervene meaningfully forced Nigerian government to assume the mantle of peace broker, eventually in 2004, a ceasefire agreement was signed. The AMIS and UNAMID Mission were both under the command of former Nigerian Defence Staff, General Martin Luther Agwai (Pham, 2007:112). The current UNAMID Deputy Joint Special Representative is also a Nigerian, Abiodun Bashua. He was appointed 2014 by the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon (Sudan Tribune, 2014). Such is the role played by Nigeria in Sudan crisis. The summary of Nigeria's multilateral operations since independence were presented in table 3.

Table 3: List of Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations by Nigeria since Independence

NAME	COUNTRY	ORGANISATION	YEAR	ROLE
ONUC	CONGO	UNO	1960-1964	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND FORCE COMMANDER
UNSF	NEW GUINEA	UNSF	1962-1963	MILITARY OBSERVERS
OAUTM	TANZANIA	OAU	1964	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND TRAINING
UNIPOM	INDIA/PAKISTAN	UNO	1965-1966	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNFIL	LEBANON	UNO	1978	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
OAUPMC 1	CHAD	OAU	1981-1982	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
OAUPMC 2	CHAD	OAU	1982-83	BRIGADE OPERATIONS
UNIMOG	IRAN/IRAQ	UNO	1988-1991	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNAVEM	ANGOLA	UNO	1989	MILITARY OPERATIONS AND DETACHMENT
UNTAG	NAMIBIA	UNO	1989-1990	MILITARY OBSERVERS
NATAG	SIERRA LEONE	UNO-OAU	1991	TRAINING TEAM
ONUMOZ	MOZAMBIQUE	UNO	1992-1994	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNTAC	CAMBODIA	UNO	1992-1993	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNOSOM	SOMALIA	UNO	1992-1995	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
UNIPROFOR	YUGOSLAVIA	UNO	1992-1994	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
MINORSO	SOMALIA	OAU	1995	BATTALION OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
NATAG	GAMBIA	UNO	1993	TRAINING TEAM
UNASOG	AOUZOU STRIP, CHAD/LIBYA	UNO	1994	MILITARY OBSERVER
UNTSO	ISRAEL	UNO	1995	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNCRO	CROATIA	UNO	1995-1996	RESTORATION OPERATIONS
UNIKOM	IRAQ/IRAN	UNO	1991-2002	MILITARY OBSERVERS
UNAMIR	RWANDA	UNO	1993-1996	BATTALION OPERATIONS
UNOMIL	LIBERIA	UNO	1993-1997	OPERATIONS
ECOMOG	LIBERIA	ECOWAS	1990-1997	OPERATIONS
ECOMOG	SIERRA LEONE	ECOWAS	1998	MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STAFF OFFICERS
ECOMOCI	COTE D'IVOIRE	ECOWAS	2002	BATTALION OPERATIONS
UNAMID	SUDAN	UNO	2003	MILITARY OPERATIONS, TRAINING AND DEPUTY JOINT SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Source: Author's compilation. (2022)

Thus, Nigerian multilateral peacekeeping role since independence has been to maintain peace and stability in the globe. Nigerian government has embarked on various missions under multilateral organisations to ensure there is political stability in the global environment and for this to be achieved there is a need for stable polity throughout the world. One would wonder why Nigeria takes responsibility for maintenance of peace and order in Africa and elsewhere in the globe. Nigerian government is of the conviction that any problem or instability in any corner of the globe affects its own peaceful existence either directly or indirectly. In order to make sure that

its own security is guaranteed, West African region becomes Nigeria's priority. This assertion is true as the world is now more connected than before. The shooting down of MH17, a Malaysian flight, over the airspace of Ukraine by rebels clearly lends credence to this. In its attempt at stemming the tide of political instability, therefore, Nigeria has engaged in virtually all UN peacekeeping and observer mission. According to the Polish Ambassador to Nigeria, Grezgorz Walinski, having been involved in 40 out of the 55 peacekeeping mission of the UN, Nigeria has now participated in 73% of all peacekeeping operations. Four of these missions have been commandeered by Nigeria senior military officers. Currently, Nigeria has about 6,000 peacekeepers in various flashpoints, 4,000 of which are in Darfur, Sudan (Nigerian Vanguard, 2013).

In OAU/AU and ECOWAS, Nigeria has been involving itself in stabilizing political terrain of Africa immediately after independence. The African problem is always at the centre of Nigerian foreign policy and this has been the case since 1960. This is confirmed by the views of Adeyemi (2015), that African problems have always been occupied the attention of Nigerian government since independence. No African country has been doing the way Nigeria does. We are the most ubiquitous of all countries in Africa especially where conflict and dispute occur. I have been to Somalia and Sudan under peacekeeping operations of Nigerian police force. I do not see any African country that march the standard and the way Nigeria operates. Although, Nigeria at some points of its political history also suffered political instability, its capabilities to constantly deal with its internal problems serve as strength to replicates such experience at international level. The successful end of Nigerian civil war in 1970 attests to this position. Starting from the Congo crisis in 1960, Nigeria assumed the position of leadership to settle the political, ethnic and border problems between nations involved.

Global Peacekeeping Operations

At global level, Nigerian government also maintains its peacekeeping role. In 1962, Nigerian humanitarian mission was sent to the Papua New Guinea in the Asia Pacific to ensure stability in that part of the world. In relation to the Pakistan-Indian dispute, Nigerian soldiers were part of observer mission in 1965 under the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM) with a Nigerian battalion as observers (see Table3). In its peacekeeping effort, Nigeria sent its soldiers to Lebanon in 1978 under the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL).

Furthermore, in 1992, Nigeria police force was deployed to Cambodia under United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) as observers to maintain tranquility in that part of the globe. During the First Gulf War (1980-1988), Nigerian army was on supervision and observation mission under United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIMOG). In the Gulf War, between Iraq and Kuwait, Nigeria was part of the mission that supervised peace between the two countries in 1992. The most important aspect of Nigeria's global multilateral operation takes place in Haiti where 121 Nigerian police officers serve under United Nations Formed Police Unit since 2004 (Ezigbo, 2010). The massive earthquake that devastated the country in January

2010 killed a Nigerian whose name has been identified by the UN as Ms. Dede Yebovi Fadairo (UNSC, 2012). She was an Associate Report Writing Officer in Haiti under the UN. Hence, Nigeria's record in the multilateral peacekeeping operations under the UN, OAU, and ECOWAS is notable.

Peacekeeping Remittance as a Source of Generating Income

Nigeria also benefit financially through multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. The multilateral peacekeeping operation in Nigeria's foreign policy started in the Congo shortly after independence and it has been a source of foreign exchange earnings to Nigerian government since (Sule, 2013:16). It should be noted that the multilateral peacekeeping operation in the ECOWAS and OAU/AU is attributable to the hegemonic aspiration of Nigeria in the global politics where the finance is usually borne by Nigerian government. That of the UN is two-fold: Serving as source of income and also a means to promote its leadership aspiration in the global politics (Adeniji, 2005:2). Nigeria's participation in the UN Peace and Security Operations (PSO) serves as source of revenue to the government in many ways. First, the reimbursement collected from the military hardware and equipment used in the various mission areas are utilized to procure new military equipment for Nigerian military (Onuorah, 2013). Therefore, the obsolete equipment is expected to be replaced by the new ones, and reimbursement is also received from the UN on food items, clothing, medicine, and logistics.

Troops are also paid monthly allowances and this depends on the number of troops a country supply to a mission (Sule, 2013:35). In the UN, Nigeria is one of the largest troops-contributing nations in the world and this suggests that the amount the Nigerian government will be getting from rendering this service is significant to the national revenue generation. For example, the amount Nigerian government received on equipment within 1999 and 2000 for its operation in UNAMSIL amounted to \$798,063 which is a substantial amount by African standard (Ezigbo, 2010). According to the UN (1996), each personnel is paid \$1,349 by the UN and the money is always paid directly to the Nigerian government. In this case, Nigeria government pays each troop \$600 which suggests that on each troop contributed to the UN mission, Nigerian government gains \$734 (Reuben, 2008:6). It needs to be stated here that there is no fixed amount being paid by the UN to peacekeeping nations, it varies from one country and operation to another. For example, in Liberian mission, each troop was paid \$1000 per month, this means that the Nigerian government will decide what to be its revenue through the well standard procedure laid down (Onuorah, 2013).

The above analysis thus nullifies popular belief that the participation of Nigeria in the PSO in the UN is a waste of the country's finance. Many Nigerians are not aware that government benefits from mobilizing Nigerian troops to the UN and it is the responsibility of the government and the media to sensitize people on this in order to reduce the intensity with which the public criticize the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping in the UN. It is only when it comes to the continental peacekeeping under the AU and the ECOWAS that Nigeria normally choose to

shoulder responsibility of peacekeeping (see Chapter Four). Thus, contrary to popular opinion, the Nigeria's multilateral peacekeeping operation is a source of revenue for Nigerian government.

Conclusion

The research shows that regional powers are very effective in settling and maintaining peace and order. Going by Nigeria's records, the research found that regional hegemons are better equipped to settle regional conflicts than non-regional powers. This is best illustrated by the Liberian civil war, where Nigeria's army suffered over 300 casualties, whereas the US was forced to withdraw its troops after recording 18 casualties in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. Nigeria in contrast stood firm in the face of rebel assault led by Charles Taylor in Liberia. There was also domestic opposition to Nigeria's campaign in Liberia, but the Nigerian government insisted peace must be restored at all cost to Liberia. It needs to be stressed that while the US intervention in Somalia was not to achieve any immediate goals and objectives, Nigeria's intervention may be said to be intertwined with the West African regional security as a whole. In this case, Liberia's direct security threat to Nigeria may well explain Nigeria's insistence on quelling the conflict in Liberia. Such immediate threat was nonexistent in the US case in Somalia. The Mano River crisis, which comprised Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Gambia, was all put to rest by Nigeria-led ECOMOG forces.

References

- Abass, A. (2004). *Regional organisations and the development of collective security: beyond chapter VIII of the UN Charter*. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Abdulwaheed, I.A (2012). Nigeria and peacekeeping process in Africa: the Darfur peace process in Sudan. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, 3(3), 121.
- Adebajo, A. (2008). Nigeria: Africa's new gendarme?. *Security Dialogue*, 31(2), 185-199.
- Adebajo, A. (2002). *Liberia's civil war: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and regional security in West Africa*. Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Adeniji, A. (2005). Power and Representation at the United Nations: A Critique of Nigeria's Bid for Permanent Seat in the Security Council. *India Quarterly*, 61(2), 116.
- Adetula, V.O (2005). Nigeria and the African union. In O.U. Joy (Ed) *New Horizon for Nigeria in world affairs* (pp. 157-186). Nigeria: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs.
- Adigbuo, R. (2013). Diplomatic and Military Co-operations in Nigeria's Foreign Policy. *International Affairs and Global Strategy*, 13, 11-21.
- Agbakwuru, J. (2013, October 31). Nigeria spends \$13bn on peace-keeping. *The Vanguard*
- Akande, L. (2012, August 30). Nigeria leads campaign against small arms at UN. *The Guardian*
- Amoo, S.G. (nd). Frustrations of Regional Peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 1977-1982. The Carter Centre Retrieved from www.cartercenter.org/documents/1208.pdf on 25/2/2015
- Babangida, I.B. (1990) Text of Press Briefing at Dodan Barracks, Lagos on Wednesday October 31, 1990
- Bach, D. C. (2007). Nigeria's manifest destiny in West Africa: dominance without power. *Africa Spectrum* 42 (2), 301-321

- Chibundu, V. N. (2003). *Foreign Policy: With Particular Reference to Nigeria (1961-2002)*. Nigeria: Spectrum Books.
- Delancey, M. (1983). Nigeria: foreign policy alternatives. In S.M Timothy & A.Olajide Eds), *Nigerian foreign policy: alternative projections* (pp.164-190). Hong Kong: Macmillan Press Ltd.
- Ebegbulem, J. C. (2012). The Failure of Collective Security in the Post World Wars I and II International System. *international journal of peace and conflict studies* 1(1), 110
- Ebohon, S. I., & Isike, C. A. (2004) The Dilemma of Big Brother Diplomacy: An Analysis of Nigeria's Role in the Resolution of Ivorian Crisis. *The International Journal Series on Tropical Issues*, 4(3), 39 – 51
- Ero, C. (1995). ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia. *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*
- Eugene, E.O. (2014) Nigeria In International And Intra-National Military Interventions: From Pre-Colonial Times To Independence. *Journal of History* 1(3), 1-12.
- Fafowara, O. (1997). Nigeria: Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Disarray. *African Journal of International Affairs*, 1(1), 51-56.
- Fawole, A. (2004). A continent in crisis: Internal conflicts and external interventions in Africa. *African Affairs*, 103, 297-303.
- Hamman, S., & Omojuwa, K. (2013). The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping Operations from 1960 to 2013. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(16), 27
- IRIN, (2014) "Liberia-Nigeria: Obasanjo Agrees to Hand over Taylor" <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp>, Retrieved October 12, 2014.
- Kratochwil, F. (1994). The functions of international organisations, peacekeeping, mediation, and global policies. In K. Friedrich and M.D. Edward (Eds) *international organisations, a Reader* (234-237). USA: HarperCollins College Publishers
- Mays, T. M. (2002). *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982*. Greenwood Publishing Group
- Ngwube, A. (2013). Nigeria's Peace Keeping Role in Darfur. *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences*, 4(1).
- Obayuwana, O. (2012, June 12). Nigeria, Ecowas chief, others seek UN's support. *The Nigerian Guardian*
- Ogaba, O. (2000). Nigeria's role in International Conflict Management. in H.I Ajaegwu, B.J St. Mathew – Daniel and O.E Uyo (Eds), *Nigeria: A People United A future Assured Vol 1 Abuja: Federal Ministry of Information*
- Ojekwe, A. A. (2010). Peacekeeping in West Africa: an analysis of Nigeria's roles, 1990-2005.
- Oladimeji, T., & Ahmad, M. Z. (2015). Nigeria as a Regional Hegemony in the Periphery since 1960: An Empirical Analysis. Available at SSRN 2683948.
- Olofinmuagun EO, (1995) "Economic Benefits of United Nations Peace Support Operations to Nigeria: An Appraisal, being a Research Project submitted to National War College, Abuja
- Olonisakin, F. (1998). Changing perspectives on human rights in Africa. In A. Sola & S. Amadu (Eds), *Africa in the post-cold war international system* (pp. 95-109). Great Britain: Pinter Publishers.
- Saka, L (2008), "Vanguard of Peace: An Assessment of Nigeria's contributions to the Sudanese Peace process. *Africana*", *A Journal of ideas on Africa and the African Diaspora*, .2, (1)

- Salami, B. O. (2013).the “new” economic diplomacy of the nigerian state, 1988-1993: anevaluation. *Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences*, 1(3), 146-151.
- Saliu, H. A. (2007). Nigeria” s National Interests in a Globalizing World. *FurtheReflections onConservative and Beneficial Concentricism.(Volume three:Nigerians Interests beyond Nigeria)* Ibadan. Boly Interventional Publishers.
- Sesay, A. (1998). Regional and sub-regional conflict management efforts.In A. Sola & S.Amadu (Eds), *Africa in the post-cold war international system* (pp. 43-72). Great Britain: Pinter Publishers.
- Sesay, A. (1991). The Limits of Peace-Keeping by a Regional Organization:TheOAUPeaceKeeping Force in Chad. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, 11(1).
- Sule, A.M. (2013). Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operations. (a thesis presented in partial completion of the requirement in the certificate-of-training in the united nations peace support operations). UN Peace Operation Training Institute, Abuja.
- Stahn, C. (2003). The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002). *European Journal of International Law*, 14(1), 85-104.
- UNSC Reports on Mali (2012) retrieved from <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/malisahel/> on 23/03/2015
- UNSC Report (2003) retrieved from<http://www.cfr.org/liberia/un-security-councilresolution-1509-liberia/p24236> on 12/4/2015.